More than six decades after African independence swept the continent in the 1960s, 14 African nations remain financially tethered to their former colonizer through one of history’s most enduring colonial institutions: the CFA franc. This monetary system, used by over 180 million people across West and Central Africa, represents what critics call the final frontier of decolonization.
The CFA franc’s persistence raises fundamental questions about sovereignty, economic autonomy, and modern imperialism. While political independence was granted in the early 1960s, monetary independence—the ability to control currency, set monetary policy, and manage foreign reserves—was deliberately withheld.
The CFA franc was created on December 26, 1945, by General Charles de Gaulle following World War II. The acronym originally stood for “Colonies Françaises d’Afrique” (French Colonies of Africa). The currency emerged from French weakness—specifically, the dramatic devaluation of the French franc after the Bretton Woods Agreement.
France created separate colonial currencies to spare African territories from devaluation’s worst effects while binding them tighter to the French economic sphere. A 1960 article in La Croix admitted the system allowed France to obtain raw materials without disbursing foreign currency.
When African nations gained independence in the 1960s, the CFA franc underwent cosmetic transformation. The acronym became “Communauté Financière Africaine” (African Financial Community) for West Africa and “Coopération Financière en Afrique Centrale” (Financial Cooperation in Central Africa) for Central Africa. The name changed, but control remained.
France granted independence peacefully to most colonies—unlike violent struggles in Indochina and Algeria—precisely because it secured agreements ensuring French economic dominance would continue. The absence of revolutionary warfare meant French exploitation systems persisted.
The fate of resisters illustrates the stakes. On January 13, 1963, Togolese President Sylvanus Olympio was assassinated by French-trained soldiers days before creating a Togolese franc. The coup leader, Gnassingbé Eyadéma, ruled as a French-backed dictator for five decades.
As the mechanics of France’s monetary control there is the dual currency system. The CFA franc exists as two separate currencies:
West African CFA franc (XOF): Eight countries in WAEMU—Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. Issued by BCEAO in Dakar.
Central African CFA franc (XAF): Six CEMAC countries—Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. Issued by BEAC in Yaoundé.
Both share the same exchange rate with the euro (1 euro = 655.957 CFA francs), guaranteed by the French Treasury, but are not interchangeable. Transactions between zones must go through France, reinforcing French centrality.
The Four Pillars of Control
1. Fixed Parity to the Euro
Both CFA francs are pegged to the euro at a fixed rate guaranteed by France. Before 1999, they were pegged to the French franc. African central banks cannot change this peg. Effectively, monetary policy for these nations is set by the European Central Bank in Frankfurt, with Germany having disproportionate influence.
This strips CFA countries of fundamental economic sovereignty: the ability to adjust currency value in response to economic conditions. When commodity prices crash or shocks hit, nations cannot devalue to stimulate exports or protect industries. They must absorb shocks through fiscal measures—typically brutal austerity devastating public services.
2. Centralization of Foreign Reserves
The most controversial aspect: member countries must deposit substantial foreign exchange reserves with the French Treasury:
1945-1973: 100% of foreign reserves deposited with France
1973-2005: 65% of foreign assets required
2005-2019: 50% plus additional 20% for liabilities, leaving only 30% under domestic control
2019-present: West African deposit requirement officially ended (implementation stalled); Central Africa still required to deposit 50%
These reserves sit in “operations accounts” at the French Treasury. France pays below-market interest rates, often below inflation, so deposits lose value. Between 1945-1999, France devalued the CFA franc against the French franc by 99.9%, transferring enormous wealth from Africa to France.
This provides France with billions in low-interest capital—a perpetual loan from the world’s poorest countries to one of the wealthiest. African nations channel more money to France through this mechanism than they receive in aid.
3. French Representation on Central Bank Boards
Until 2019 reforms (partially implemented), France held board seats on both African central banks with veto power over monetary policy. Even after nominal removal, France maintains influence through technical advisors, the Banque de France, and the guarantor role.
4. Convertibility Guarantee
France guarantees unlimited CFA franc convertibility into euros. Defenders cite this as France’s contribution—insurance protecting economies from currency crises and providing investor confidence.
However, this requires African nations to maintain reserves equal to at least 20% of money supply, far higher than international standards. It makes African monetary policy subservient to French and European interests. The guarantee serves French objectives by ensuring companies can repatriate profits freely and French goods remain competitively priced.
Economic impacts made stability versus sovereignty. In the case for stability proponents point to measurable benefits:
Lower Inflation: Côte d’Ivoire averaged 6% inflation over 50 years versus Ghana’s 29%. Central African Republic, Senegal, and Burkina Faso maintained relatively stable prices.
Macroeconomic Stability: Fixed peg and external guarantee protected against some crises. During COVID-19, franc zone countries recorded 0.3% GDP growth in 2020 versus 1.7% recession across sub-Saharan Africa.
Facilitated Trade: Common currency reduces transaction costs within zones and with Europe.
Access to Credit: French Treasury backing theoretically improves credit market access.
Franc CFA became the cost of dependency. Stability benefits come with profound constraints:
Suppressed Economic Growth: CFA countries experienced lower per capita growth long-term versus comparable non-CFA nations. Fixed exchange rates prevent using devaluation to boost exports—a tool crucial for Asian development.
Overvalued Currency: The CFA franc is arguably overvalued by 10-15%, making exports uncompetitively expensive while imports are artificially cheap. This undermines industrialization and perpetuates commodity dependence.
Inability to Respond to Shocks: When commodity prices fall, CFA countries cannot devalue. They must absorb shocks through decreased revenues and austerity. The devastating 1994 devaluation—when France unilaterally cut the CFA’s value in half—led to wage freezes, layoffs, and unrest as import costs doubled overnight.
Constrained Monetary Policy: CFA central banks cannot independently set interest rates or engage in quantitative easing. Credit creation is limited, starving productive sectors.
Limited Intra-African Trade: Despite common currencies, trade between CFA countries is only 9% of total trade. The structure incentivizes trade with Europe over intra-African commerce.
Reinforced Commodity Dependence: The system locks countries into exporting raw materials and importing manufactured goods, perpetuating colonial economic patterns.
Between 1950-1985, CFA countries generally outperformed other sub-Saharan nations. Côte d’Ivoire achieved 9.5% annual GDP growth from 1960-1978. However, this advantage eroded after 1986-1993 economic shocks. Ghana and other reformers began catching up.
From 2011-2021, no clear relationship exists between CFA membership and growth. CFA nation Côte d’Ivoire had the second-best sub-Saharan performance, while CFA nation Gabon declined 2% annually for a decade. Other factors—governance, resources, stability—matter more than monetary arrangements.
France benefits from the economics of Neo-Colonialism having direct financial gains from Africa. France derives substantial benefits, though exact figures are contested:
Interest-Free Capital: African countries depositing 50% of reserves gives France massive interest-free loans. Estimates suggest $20-50 billion in African reserves held at various points, deployed in French markets while paying minimal interest (historically around 0.75%, below inflation and market rates).
Guaranteed Markets: The CFA ensures captive markets for French goods. The overvalued CFA franc makes French exports artificially competitive. Combined with linguistic and cultural legacies, French companies enjoy enormous advantages.
Resource Access: French multinationals maintain privileged access to uranium from Niger (powering French nuclear plants), oil from Gabon and Chad, cocoa from Côte d’Ivoire, phosphates from Senegal and Togo. The currency arrangement ensures resources are purchased with effectively domestic currency and profits repatriated freely.
Strategic Positioning: Beyond economics, the CFA gives France geopolitical leverage and maintains global power status.
French companies dominate key sectors:
Telecommunications: Orange (state-owned) leads mobile operations
Banking: BNP Paribas, Société Générale, Crédit Agricole control banking
Logistics: Bolloré Group controls ports, railways, logistics
Energy: TotalEnergies dominates oil and gas
Nuclear: Orano mines uranium in Niger
Retail: Carrefour and other chains expanded
Construction: Bouygues and Vinci are major contractors
These companies operate with minimal currency risk, freely repatriate profits, and face limited competition. The model resembles colonialism: African raw materials extracted by French companies, manufactured goods imported from France, profits to Paris.
France potentially benefits from monetary seigniorage—profit from creating money. The French Treasury’s control over operations accounts exercises de facto control over CFA currency creation. Some analysts estimate France has derived several hundred billion euros over decades, though figures are disputed.
The fundamental asymmetry is undeniable: African nations provide France low-cost capital while receiving limited benefits beyond monetary stability—which could arguably be achieved through less exploitative arrangements.
France has historically maintained the CFA system through various means:
Political Assassinations: Olympio’s 1963 murder sent clear messages. Suspicions surround other deaths including Burkina Faso’s Thomas Sankara (1987). WikiLeaks documents suggest French involvement in Libya was partly motivated by Gaddafi’s plan to replace the CFA with a gold dinar.
Military Intervention: France maintained permanent military presence throughout post-independence, conducting over 40 interventions between 1960-1990. While publicly justified as maintaining stability, interventions often protected French economic interests.
Economic Sanctions: ECOWAS, influenced by France, wielded sanctions against challengers. When Niger’s military government questioned the CFA in 2024, sanctions prevented market access, causing severe disruption.
Co-optation of Elites: France cultivated relationships with African political and economic elites, ensuring beneficiaries have incentives to maintain the system.
The CFA’s persistence isn’t solely French imposition. Significant African constituencies benefit:
Political Elites: Can easily transfer wealth abroad, evade capital controls, park assets in stable euros. The system enables capital flight and facilitates corruption.
Financial Sector Executives: Central bank and commercial bank leaders benefit from positions within the Franco-African system.
Import-Dependent Businesses: Companies importing European goods benefit from overvalued currency making imports cheap.
Urban Middle Classes: The CFA provides stability and makes imported consumer goods affordable, benefiting urban populations more than rural agricultural workers.
This internal constituency makes reform politically complicated. France has cultivated a system where African elites’ interests align with arrangements ultimately benefiting France most.
African opposition has exploded from academic circles into mass movements.
A generation more educated and globally connected increasingly views the CFA as subjugation. The 2018 song “7 Minutes Against the CFA” by African musicians became an anthem: “Imagine that your wallet is someone else’s pocket” and “Break the chains of this economic slavery.”
Protests erupted in Bamako, Ouagadougou, Dakar, and other capitals. Demonstrators burn French flags, chant “Down with the CFA,” and demand monetary sovereignty. Beninese activist Kemi Seba’s 2017 public burning of a 5,000 CFA note sparked widespread debate.
Groups like “Urgences Panafricanistes” organized boycotts and coordinated campaigns. In May 2025, activists organized conferences across African capitals building momentum.
Artists and musicians made opposition central to contemporary African culture. Senegalese singer Tièmoko Koné stated: “Whoever controls the currency of a country controls its economy.”
Leaders have recently broken tradition to criticize the CFA.
Burkina Faso’s Ibrahim Traoré: “Perhaps everything we’ve done has surprised you, hasn’t it? More changes might still surprise you. And it’s not just about currency. We will break all ties that keep us in slavery.”
Niger’s Abdourahamane Tiani: “There is no longer any question of our countries being the cash cows of France. France has robbed us for more than 107 years. [A new] currency is a way out of this colonization.”
Mali’s Assimi Goïta: Joined Burkina Faso and Niger in forming the Alliance of Sahel States, exploring monetary alternatives.
Senegal’s Bassirou Diomaye Faye: Elected March 2024 partly on promises to reduce foreign economic manipulation, making ending the CFA a campaign theme. His victory in traditionally pro-French Senegal signals significant public sentiment shifts.
Benin’s Patrice Talon: Even moderate leaders question the arrangement: “Psychologically, with regards to the vision of sovereignty and managing your own money, it’s not good that this model continues.”
Prominent economists provide intellectual firepower:
Ndongo Samba Sylla: Called 2019 reforms “more symbolic than transformative,” arguing “monetary sovereignty is the final frontier of African liberation.”
Kako Nubukpo: Former UEMOA official described the system as “voluntary servitude.”
Ndiaye Sékou: “We gained flags and anthems in the 1960s, but we never fully regained control of our economies.”
This intellectual critique shifted debate from whether to reform the CFA to how and when it will end.
On December 21, 2019, President Macron and Ivorian President Ouattara announced “historic” reform:
Rename West African CFA franc to “Eco”
Eliminate 50% deposit requirement with French Treasury
Remove French representatives from BCEAO board
Implementation initially 2020, later pushed to 2027. The announcement was designed to blunt criticism while preserving French influence.
The reality of limited change came. Analysis reveals limited nature:
Cosmetic Name Change: Rebranding as “Eco” changes nothing substantive. The currency would still peg to the euro, be guaranteed by France, and face the same constraints.
Reserve Requirement Loophole: While countries wouldn’t be required to deposit reserves, they’d still need them to back currency under the convertibility guarantee. France continues as guarantor. Reform only applies to West Africa; Central Africa still faces deposits.
Superficial Governance Changes: Removing French board representatives appears significant, but France retains influence through advisors, the guarantee mechanism, and coordination with African central banks. The euro peg means the ECB still effectively sets policy.
Euro Peg Remains: The most fundamental dependency—the fixed euro peg—remains unchanged. Countries still cannot conduct independent monetary policy. As Harvard researchers noted: “A monetary system that holds a former colonial power as the guarantor, regardless of announcements or agreements, will always ultimately fail to eradicate neocolonialism.”
As of early 2025, the Eco hasn’t been implemented. African countries cannot agree on terms. Nigeria and Ghana refuse to join while tied to France and the euro. ECOWAS set convergence criteria most countries fail to meet. Military coups across the Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger) disrupted regional cooperation. These countries withdrew from ECOWAS exploring their own alternatives.
Despite public support, France has little incentive for changes ending monetary control. A December 2024 French Foreign Affairs Committee report acknowledged reforms have been incomplete.
The Eco symbolizes how difficult achieving genuine monetary independence is. Announcements and gestures cannot substitute for structural change.
The most radical option: leave the franc zone entirely and create independent national currencies, as Guinea did (1958), Mali attempted (1962-1984), and Mauritania did (1973).
Advantages: Full sovereignty, independent monetary policy, currency adjustments for shocks, control over all reserves, psychological independence benefits.
Challenges: Inflation risk without institutional capacity, potential loss of French guarantee and European market access, requires strong central bank institutions and fiscal discipline, may face sanctions.
Several African countries claimed to create genuinely African currency unions independent of European control. Original concept for Eco was West African currency covering all ECOWAS including Nigeria and Ghana. Creates large economic zone with genuine regional control. Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger discussed currency under Alliance of Sahel States. Economic viability questionable given small economies.
African Union discussed continental currency, though highly aspirational. Maintaining larger currency area benefits (reduced transaction costs, economies of scale), genuine African ownership, facilitates intra-African trade. It is requires convergence of different economies, needs fiscal transfers and political integration, risk of domination by larger economies, technical complexity.
Less radical reforms maintain pegs but change terms. Peg to currency basket instead of solely euro, peg to basket including dollar, yuan, euro. Reflects diverse trade relationships. Allowing gradual managed adjustments rather than fixed pegs, providing flexibility while maintaining stability.
Convertibility without reserve requirements means to keep French guarantee but eliminate deposits and French governance. As advantages could be preserving stability benefits, reduces French control while maintaining credibility, easier transition. But it is may be politically insufficient, France has little incentive to agree, risk of being “stuck in the middle.”
African countries could leapfrog traditional systems creating digital currencies enabling sovereignty while maintaining sophistication. Cryptocurrency stablecoins backed by African commodity reserves. Blockchain technology for truly pan-African currency independent of any single nation.
Advantages of this could leapfrog traditional systems, reduces need for correspondent banking, potential for financial inclusion, appeals to youth. But challenges could bring highly speculative, technical complexity, infrastructure requirements, regulatory challenges, volatility concerns.
Defenders argue opposition is mostly symbolic—countries should focus on “real” development rather than emotional attachments to sovereignty.
This fundamentally misunderstands sovereignty and development. Monetary control isn’t merely symbolic; it represents the ability to make economic choices aligned with national interests.
Moreover, symbols matter. The CFA’s colonial origins and ongoing French control serve as daily reminders of subordinate status. Every time a vendor receives a CFA coin, they handle currency bearing their colonizer’s mark.
As Dakar coffee vendor Birahim Diallo expressed: “When I see the CFA, I see my colonizer.” This reflects clear-eyed understanding that economic power determines political autonomy.
In the framed development model, the CFA enforces a particular development model:
Export-oriented: Raw materials for export rather than domestic industries
Import-dependent: Foreign manufactured goods rather than local production
Service-driven: Growth from services rather than manufacturing/agriculture
Foreign-dominated: Key sectors controlled by French/international companies
This model has produced growth but not transformation. CFA economies remain structurally similar to independence: exporting cocoa, coffee, oil, minerals, importing manufactured goods, wealth concentrated in urban centers and foreign hands.
Alternative strategies—like Asian tigers—typically required managed exchange rates supporting export competitiveness, industrial policy, capital controls, and developmental monetary policy. The CFA system makes these impossible. It enforces neoliberal economics where market forces (shaped by European interests) determine outcomes.
In the geopolitical context the CFA drama unfolds against shifting geopolitics:
China’s Rise: Became Africa’s largest trading partner, offering alternatives to Western dominance.
Russian Influence: Expanded in francophone Africa, particularly Wagner Group in Mali, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic. Their turn to Russia partly rejects French influence.
U.S. Interest: Generally supported France’s stabilizing role, though American companies increasingly compete.
Turkey and Gulf States: Increased African engagement, providing additional alternatives.
Pan-Africanism: African Union and regional organizations represent growing African agency, though remain weak and divided.
France faces declining relative global power. The CFA represents one last institutional mechanism maintaining power projection. As military forces withdraw and influence wanes, the monetary system becomes more crucial.
For African countries, geopolitical diversification creates opportunities but also risks. Chinese or Russian influence may substitute one dependency for another. True independence requires not changing masters but building genuine capacity and regional cooperation.
The CFA franc has survived eight decades by adapting while preserving essential French control. It outlived formal colonialism, weathered independence movements, persisted through globalization, absorbed multiple reforms.
However, multiple forces suggest unsustainability.
Demographic Change: Africa has the world’s youngest population. This generation views the CFA as anachronism. As they assume power, pressure intensifies.
Economic Development: As economies grow and diversify, fixed peg constraints become more burdensome.
Regional Integration: African Continental Free Trade Area requires monetary arrangements facilitating intra-African commerce, not African-European trade.
Political Instability: Sahel coups reflect dissatisfaction with traditional arrangements including monetary policy.
French Weakness: France’s declining position may reduce capacity to maintain the system.
Alternative Models: Success of other African countries managing currencies—however imperfect—demonstrates independence is possible.
Scenario 1: Gradual Reform: Eco eventually launches with reduced but continued French involvement. Evolutionary change preserving French influence while acknowledging African demands.
Scenario 2: Revolutionary Break: Countries leave dramatically, possibly following upheaval. Others follow, creating momentum for alternatives. France loses African monetary empire.
Scenario 3: Indefinite Status Quo: Despite criticism, the CFA persists through French pressure, elite self-interest, and African institutional weakness. Reforms perpetually announced and delayed.
Most likely: gradual erosion with some countries breaking away while others maintain modified arrangements. The process will be messy, contested, and slow.
The CFA raises: When does decolonization truly end? Political independence was insufficient when economic structures remained colonial. Military bases, French troops, and currency control suggest colonialism adapted rather than ended.
True decolonization requires economic sovereignty, capacity for independent decisions about development, freedom from external veto. It requires building institutions capable of managing modern monetary systems. It requires regional cooperation not replicating North-South dependency. It requires political leaders prioritizing long-term development over personal enrichment.
Whether African countries are ready for this independence is legitimate. Building strong institutions, maintaining fiscal discipline, managing monetary policy, and navigating global markets are genuinely difficult. Mismanagement risks are real.
But so are dependency risks. The current system may provide stability, but it’s the stability of stagnation. It prevents dynamic, transformative development that lifted Asia from poverty. It maintains Africa in perpetual adolescence, unable to make mistakes or claim successes.
The debate is ultimately about African agency and capability. Defenders implicitly argue African countries need European guardianship for stability. Opponents argue true development is impossible without freedom to fail and learn.
History will likely judge the CFA franc as one of history’s most successful neo-colonial institutions—preserving colonialism’s benefits for colonizers while providing just enough stability to make arrangements politically sustainable.
It represents a case study in post-colonial power: not through crude military domination but through institutional arrangements appearing neutral and technical but embedding structural inequalities. The system has been maintained not primarily through force (though violence played a role) but through co-opting elites, creating dependencies, and making exit costs appear higher than compliance costs.
For France, the CFA has been triumph—maintaining global influence far beyond actual power suggests. It provided cheap resource access, guaranteed markets, and geopolitical leverage.
For African countries, the verdict is more ambiguous. The system provided genuine monetary stability and avoided some disasters. But it also constrained development, limited sovereignty, and perpetuated dependency.
What seems increasingly clear: a new generation rejects the tradeoff. They demand sovereignty not as abstract principle but as practical development tool. They see the CFA not as benign stabilizer but as the last chain requiring breaking.
Whether they succeed—and what replaces it—will be one of 21st-century African development’s most important stories.
The CFA franc exemplifies how colonialism’s legacy persists through economic structures long after political independence. It demonstrates monetary sovereignty is not luxury or symbolic concern but fundamental independence requirement. It shows how France maintained informal empire through financial rather than military means.
For Africans in CFA countries, the choice is stark: continue with stability at sovereignty’s cost, or accept true independence’s risks and responsibilities. There is no painless middle path, no reform satisfying sovereignty demands while preserving French control.
The world watches not just to see what happens to an African currency, but to understand whether post-colonial relationships can evolve into genuinely equal partnerships or whether dependency is permanent. The answer will shape not just African development but broader decolonization worldwide.
As Senegal’s President Faye conducts speeches in both French and Wolof, renames colonial streets, and questions monetary arrangements, he signals broader awakening. The CFA franc’s days may be numbered not from grand upheaval, but because it’s become incompatible with African aspirations and dignity.
The final irony: France’s attempt to maintain influence through the CFA may ultimately undermine it. By clinging to a system increasingly seen as neo-colonial, France risks losing soft power and cultural connections long enjoyed. Graceful retreat toward genuine partnership might preserve more influence than defending the CFA at all costs.
The story isn’t finished. Its eventual ending will say much about power, sovereignty, and possibility of true equality between former colonizers and colonized. Whatever comes next, debates surrounding it have achieved something important: making visible economic dimensions of colonialism too long hidden behind technical monetary jargon. In bringing these mechanisms into public consciousness, activists, intellectuals, and ordinary Africans have taken the first step toward genuine liberation—understanding the systems that constrain them.
By Rafael Lagard